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Summary 
This article is the first study to present an econometric evaluation of wage discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in the French labor market. Having identified same-sex couples 
using the French Employment Survey, we estimate the wage gap related to sexual 
orientation in the private and public sectors, in order to analyze whether or not lesbians and 
gays suffer a wage penalty. The results obtained show the existence of a wage penalty for 
homosexual male workers, as compared with their heterosexual counterparts, in both the 
private and public sectors; the magnitude of this discrimination varies from about -6.5% in 
the private sector, to -5.5% in the public sector. In the private sector, the wage penalty 
suffered by gay employees is higher for skilled workers than for the unskilled, and – in both 
sectors – the wage penalty is higher for older workers than for younger ones. 
Discrimination is also lower in Paris than in the rest of France. As with many other 
countries, we do not find any evidence of the existence of a wage discrimination against 
lesbians. 
Keywords    Wage discrimination - Sexual orientation – Gay & Lesbians  
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0. – Introduction  
Theoretical and applied studies, have long emphasized the possible existence in the labor market of 
wage discrimination against specific population subgroups (women, foreign workers, ethnic groups 
etc.); nevertheless, one had to wait until the late nineties, to see the gradual emergence, following 
the seminal paper by BADGETT [1995], The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, of a 
literature specifically devoted to wage discrimination based on sexual orientation
1
.  
This body of work, initially developed in the US – KLAWITTER [1997], [1998], KLAWITTER & FLATT 
[1998], BLANDFORD [1999], [2000], ALLEGRETTO & ARTHUR [2001], CLAIN & LEPPEL [2001] – and in the 
UK– CALANDRINO [1999], ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2002] – led to further studies overseas and to a limited 
amount of research in other countries : Netherlands (PLUG & BERKHOUT [2004], [2008]), Sweden 
(AHMED & HAMMARSTEDT [2009]), Australia and Canada (CARPENTER [2008a], [2008b]). The main 
results highlight the existence of significant wage discrimination against gay men, usually between 
7% and 15%, but – in most of the cases – fail to find any significant wage discrimination against 
lesbians (some results even indicate the existence of a positive wage premium for lesbians). 
Despite the legislation in France prohibiting any wage discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
until now no empirical work has been conducted in this country to investigate the question of the 
existence and extent of this type of discrimination. The main obstacle to the development of such 
                                                 

 EPEE, Center for Economic Policy Studies, CNRS Institute Labor, Employment and Public Policies 
(TEPP, FR n°3126), Department of Economics, University of Evry-Val d’Essonne, 4 bd. François 
Mitterrand, 91025 Evry cedex, France. Mail: laurent@univ-evry.fr  

 Idem. Mail: fmihoubi@univ-evry.fr  
1 See BADGETT [2006] for a survey of this literature. 
2 
 
research is obviously the lack of reliable statistical sources which would permit identifying precisely 
the homosexual populations (gay and lesbian) and their individual and economic characteristics. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate in the French labor market, for both the private sector and the 
public sector, the extent of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation, using data from the 
INSEE employment survey. The first section summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on 
this subject; the second is devoted to the construction of the database and to the presentation of the 
main statistical characteristics of homosexual and heterosexual populations. The third section 
presents the main results for the private and public sectors, while the last section is devoted to 
measuring the impact of different variables (age, seniority, qualifications, etc.) on the magnitude of 
discrimination. 
1. – Literature 
After presenting the main theoretical arguments to explain the existence of wage discrimination 
against homosexual employees, gays and lesbians, we survey the main empirical results available in 
the economic literature.  
1.1. – Theory 
One knows that the economic analysis of the division of labor within households, as originally 
developed by Becker [1965] [1981] and known as the specialization theory, can be used to explain 
wage differentials between heterosexual and homosexual workers (BLACK & al. [2003], PLUG & 
BERKHOUT [2004]). Lesbians who know they have a lower probability than heterosexual women of 
living – and thus sharing the cost of living – with a male partner, invest more in human capital, thus 
obtaining higher wages in the labor market. Symmetrically, gays underinvest in human capital, as 
compared with heterosexual men, because they know they have a lower probability of needing to 
compensate in the future for the low income of a female partner specialized in home production ; as 
a result gays receive lower wages than those of straight male workers. 
While specialization theory provides some theoretical justification for incomes differences based on 
the sexual orientation of employees, there is however no necessary link to discrimination – but 
rather there are compensatory inequalities – since the income gap may well reflect productivity 
differences
2
. Two theoretical arguments exist, however, to explain the existence of a real wage 
discrimination against homosexual employees: 
(i) Statistical discrimination 
Originally developed by PHELPS [1972] and ARROW [1973], this theory of discrimination relies on the 
existence of informational imperfections preventing the employer from precisely assessing the 
individual productivity of workers. In such a context, the employer then uses the average 
productivity of the group to which a worker belongs (or is believed to belong), as an indicator of his 
individual skills. Therefore if some groups of workers are viewed, wrongly or rightly, as being less 
productive or implying extra costs for the firm, the employer can offer the workers in such groups 
lower wages than those offered to other groups. 
In this framework, the argument often advanced to explain the existence of wage discrimination 
against gay men is linked to the presence of a higher prevalence of HIV infection and AIDS in this 
sub-population group. The employer then uses sexual orientation as the signal of a greater likelihood 
of HIV infection which is associated with extra costs and lower profits for the firm (higher 
absenteeism and/or turnover rate, lower productivity due to fatigue associated with the illness, etc.). 
Symmetrical arguments that point out the important role played by certain kinds of stereotypes are 
used to explain the absence of wage discrimination against lesbians, or the existence of a lesbian 
wage premium, as found in some studies. Compared with heterosexual women, lesbians are often 
perceived as being stronger and having a more aggressive style, as being more attentive to their 
careers (PEPLAU & FINGERHUT [2004]), more independent, more competitive, with more assurance and 
confidence (KITE & DEAUX [1987]). These masculine traits are associated by employers with higher 
productivity. Similarly, compared to heterosexual couples, lesbian couples are characterized by a 
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more egalitarian domestic division of labor. This gives lesbians the opportunity to focus more on 
their professional lives and their careers than their heterosexual counterparts do. 
(ii) Taste for discrimination  
Unlike statistical discrimination, this approach, originally developed by BECKER [1957], does not rely 
on the existence of differences in average productivity between groups of workers, but relies directly 
on the fact that employers exhibit discriminative preferences. Homophobia and/or heterosexism may 
indeed be the source, for some employers, of a “disaffection” with the gay identity and/or the 
homosexual “lifestyle”, leading to a strict preference for discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
In this context, if an employer is characterized by preferences such that, for every euro of salary paid 
to a homosexual worker, he suffers a "disutility" estimated at d dollars, he will agree to hire that 
person only if he can offer her a wage equal to w(1-d) dollars, even though he is ready to offer w 
dollars to a straight employee. Wage discrimination then occurs if the number of employees 
perceived as homosexual, exceeds the number of jobs posted by non-discriminating employers, 
forcing some homosexual workers to match with discriminating employers. 
The taste for discrimination may be directly attributable to the employer in some cases; in others, it 
may be indirect and "imposed" on the employer, either by consumers or other employees. In both 
cases, it may be profitable for employers to discriminate. Indeed, if consumers experience a 
disutility from being in contact with gay employees, the employment of such employees may result 
in a partial loss of customers to the company. In such a case the employer, in order to maximize the 
profit of his firm, will express indirectly a preference for discrimination that merely reflects that of 
its customers. Similarly, the taste for discrimination expressed by an employer may be the 
consequence of the homophobia of some company employees
3
. 
The wage penalty associated with the taste for discrimination is usually not identical for gays and 
lesbians because of the different public perceptions of male and female homosexuality; public 
attitudes towards gays being generally more negative and hostile than they are towards lesbians (see 
BERILL [1992], KITE & WHITLEY [1996]), the wage penalty induced is also higher. 
Considering the different theoretical elements presented above, the wage discriminations 
experienced by gays and lesbians should not be of the same magnitude:  
– Compared to heterosexual men, gay men suffer a double wage penalty, associated with 
both a strong taste for discrimination and a statistical discrimination effect; 
– Compared to heterosexual women, lesbians suffer a taste for discrimination (i) smaller that 
for gays and (ii) probably partially balanced by a positive wage premium linked to the 
statistical discrimination effect. 
The combination of the two effects – statistical discrimination and the taste for discrimination –, 
should then lead to an estimate of a higher wage penalty for gays than for lesbians (the wage penalty 
for lesbians could even be strictly negative corresponding, in such a case, to a lesbian wage 
premium). 
1.2. – Homophobia 
Homophobia leads to a vulnerability of homosexuals in the workplace. Between one quarter and two 
thirds of gays and lesbians interviewed for various US surveys reported having lost their jobs or 
missing promotions because of their sexual orientation (BADGETT [1997])
4
. 
Negative attitudes toward homosexuality, although less prevalent in France than in the US, do 
remain significant: 21% of French respondents in 2002 believe that homosexuality is a lifestyle that 
should not be accepted by society (PRCPP [2002]). In a 2004 poll
5
, 20% of respondents stated 
"homosexuals should not have the same rights as heterosexuals"; 31% stated "homosexuals have an 
abnormal sexuality”; 23% said “homosexuals should be banned from certain occupations involving 
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of the French population over 15 years of age. 
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constant contact with children”; 20% believed that “they are not really people like others” and 
finally 7% stated that “violence against homosexuals is sometimes understandable”. In 2007, 23% of 
the French said they disagree with the idea that homosexuality is "a way like another to live 
sexuality”.6 In 2008, 16% said they were uncomfortable or not fully comfortable with "the idea of 
having a gay neighbor" and 27% with "the idea of a gay or a lesbian being President"
7
. 
If one looks now at the consequences of homophobia, the 2009 Report on Homophobia in France
8
 
underlines that homophobia in the workplace is the main reason for calls to the association SOS 
Homophobia (16% of the calls to the association); 85% of the people reporting suffering of 
homophobic events in the workplace are men, a finding which is consistent with the evidence 
observed in the US of a more negative public attitude towards gays than towards lesbians. Similarly, 
physical assaults – as recorded by SOS Homophobia – mainly involve homosexuals (80%). 
Employees and workers (30% of the French population) represent 60% of the cases, while 38% of 
the phone calls to the association result from sanctions or discrimination in the workplace. 
The extent of homophobia in the workplace is shown by the recent report of the French Equal 
Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission (HALDE), which highlights that 88% of the gays 
and lesbians surveyed, have been, at least once throughout their careers, victims or witnesses of 
homophobia; 40% were victims at least once. This homophobia comes mainly from colleagues, 
especially if they are conservatives, religious believers and males. Concerning the types of 
discrimination experienced: 12% of the people involved report having been passed over for an 
internal promotion, 8% report discrimination during a hiring process, 4.5% claim they were fired, 
and 4.5% say they are underpaid compare to straight men with identical levels of skills and 
responsibilities. In another survey, conducted in 2009, for the French Equal Opportunities and Anti-
Discrimination Commission and the International Labour Organization 
9
, 17% of private sector 
employees (vs. 8% in the public sector) consider that being gay is an impediment to career 
advancement.  
1.3. – Problems 
The identification of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation poses specific problems, 
potentially leading to difficulties in the econometric estimation of the extent of discrimination and 
even the interpretation of results. 
First, as some homosexual employees are not identified as such by their employers
10
, wage 
discrimination measured in a sample of all homosexual employees, represents an underestimate of 
the actual discrimination experienced by workers whose sexual orientation is known to the employer 
(cf. BLACK & al. [2003]). 
From a methodological point of view, one of the main difficulties is that, unlike gender or ethnic 
origin, sexual orientation is not a characteristic perfectly and directly observable by the employer. 
However, as pointed out by Badgett [1995], sexual orientation must be – in one way or another – 
known to the employer, before one may speak of wage discrimination against homosexual workers. 
Several points arise from this situation. 
First, even if sexual orientation is not always immediately and fully observable, the employer may 
progressively acquire such information through a learning process: inference from other observable 
variables (marital status, existence of children, neighborhood of residence, status with respect to the 
military and national service), rumors reported by other employees, absence of any reference by 
homosexual employees to their private lives, lower participation in the social life of the firm, etc. As 
                                                 
6 IFOP survey conducted from December 2006 to March 2007 for the newspaper Réforme, “Voting intentions of 
Protestants for the presidential election”, March 2007. National sample of 15000 persons, representative of the 
French population.  
7 European Commission [2008], Discrimination in the European Union: 2008, Eurobarometer Special survey 
n°296. 
8 2009 Report on Homophobia, Association SOS Homophobia ed. 
9 CSA Institute, poll n° 0900383: Perception of discriminations in the workplace: viewpoints of private sector 
employees and of public servants, conducted in March 2009 on national representative samples of private and 
public sector employees. 
10
 It is recalled here that 27% of gay and lesbian employees do not disclose their sexual orientation in the 
workplace, which is considered to be a place where the act of hiding sexual orientation is important (FALCOZ 
[2008]). 
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the learning process takes time, observed wage discrimination should then increase with the number 
of years in the company. Moreover, as the observation of a specific state – such as for example 
“being single” or “not having children” – conveys more information about the sexual orientation of 
an individual employee when the employee is older than when he is younger, one can also expect an 
increasing level of discrimination with age. These considerations underscore the importance of 
including in the wage equation, as control variables, all the variables that influence the information 
acquisition process of the employer. 
Second, if knowledge by the employer of an employee’s sexual orientation is necessary to be 
allowed to talk of a direct discrimination, hiding one’s homosexuality11 to avoid such a revelation is 
not a strategy without costs that will fully protect the employee from any negative effect on wages. 
The actions used to implement such a strategy (concealment, limited social interaction, forced 
mobility, continuous vigilance) are costly in terms of productivity – as a consequence of stress and 
the energy used – and also result in a lower integration of the employee in the firm’s internal 
networks, which has an impact on careers. These two effects combine and ultimately lead to a wage 
gap, characterizing an indirect discrimination (BADGETT [1995]): two employees, gay and straight, 
with identical "potential productivity", are paid differently because of a "real productivity" gap, 
itself linked to a negative impact of the work environment on the productivity of gay workers only. 
Although, in theory, direct and indirect discrimination could easily be separated by introducing 
individual productivity as a control variable in the wage equation, this is difficult to implement 
because of a lack of reliable data on such a control variable. 
Sexual orientation may also influence the choice of occupation, which becomes at least partly 
endogenous (cf. BLACK & al. [2003]). It is probably the same for some other variables that may be 
partially endogenous: industry, geographic location, degrees, etc. One should then be cautious when 
interpreting the estimated coefficients of a wage equation which includes these variables as control 
variables. 
The foregoing remarks refer to a more general and well known problem, when working on wage 
discrimination: the number and kind of control variables used in the wage equation. It is known 
from Oaxaca [1973] that a more or less wide integration of these control variables has a direct and 
strong impact on the measurement of wage discrimination
12
. One thus faces a dilemma: 
– either one introduces many control variables in order to achieve a precise measurement of 
"pure" wage discrimination, i.e. with all things being equal, but at the risk of 
underestimating the actual discrimination if some of these control variables are themselves 
the result of discriminatory practices; or 
– one excludes a priori any control variable that can itself, at least partially, results from of 
discriminatory practices, but at the risk of excluding many important controls and thus 
overestimating wage discrimination. 
This point is of particular importance here, since part of the discrimination against gays and lesbians 
finds its origin in the process of internal promotion which works differently – i.e. with 
heterogeneous probabilities of success – for heterosexual and homosexual employees (see FRANK 
[2006]). Controlling too precisely for the "type" of position can thus lead to an underestimation of 
wage discrimination based on sexual orientation
13
. 
Another question is whether to include marital status (married vs. not married) as a control variable 
in the wage equation. Indeed, numerous articles point out the existence of a marriage premium that 
positively affects the income of married workers only. All these studies emphasize the central role 
played by such a premium when estimating wage discrimination against homosexual employees. 
ELMSLIE & TEBALDI [2007] show that the marriage premium explains more than half of the wage gap 
                                                 
11 According to FALCOZ [2008], more than 30% of gays and lesbians surveyed said they had intentionally 
hidden their sexual orientation in their workplace. 
12 OAXACA [1973], in his seminal study on gender wage discrimination, shows that the share of the gender wage 
gap due to discrimination, decreases from 77% to 58% when controlling for industry and occupation. 
13 If the probability of accessing executive positions is lower for homosexuals than for heterosexuals with 
identical characteristics, but once gays and lesbians become executives they are paid the same, (i) the 
proportion of gay or lesbian employees among executives will be low (gay glass ceiling) and thus the average 
wage will be lower for homosexual employees than for heterosexual ones, but (ii) a wage discrimination based 
on sexual orientation will appear, only if the variable "Executive position vs. non-executive position" is not 
used as a control variable in the wage equation. 
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between gays and married heterosexual employees
14
. The question is thus to know if one must 
compare the earnings of gay employees to those of all heterosexuals or only to those of unmarried 
heterosexuals. As noted by FRANK [2007], the main difficulty arises from the fact that the marriage 
premium has a double meaning: (i) on one hand it can be explained by the intrinsic properties of 
marriage (long term commitment valued by employers) or those of married individuals (positive 
valuation of specific personal characteristics on the "marriage market", that are also valued in the 
workplace), or (ii) on the other hand, in an homophobic environment, it can simply be a premium to 
heterosexuality, with marriage taken as the signal of the latter
15
. In such a situation, not introducing 
the marriage premium as a control variable leads to overestimating wage discrimination based on 
sexual orientation (by considering as a result of discriminatory practices against gays and lesbians 
wage differentials which, at least partly, also penalize unmarried heterosexual employees), while 
introducing it leads to underestimating the level of discrimination (since part of the marriage 
premium is the result of discrimination against gays and lesbians, rather than discrimination in favor 
of marriage as such). 
Regarding this set of issues concerning which control variables to take into account, a solution 
increasingly adopted in the literature consists of being rather "generous" with the number of control 
variables – to avoid artificially increasing the observed magnitude of discrimination – although 
knowing that one then estimates a lower bound of the actual discrimination. This is the choice made 
in this paper. 
1.4. – Statistical sources and results 
The identification of homosexual and heterosexual employees, and the availability of reliable 
economic data on these two populations, constitute the two main challenges involved in building a 
database that will permit the measurement of discrimination against gays and lesbians (which 
probably explains the low number of empirical studies on this issue). Two different methods are 
used in the literature to build such a database. 
(i) Indirect identification of homosexual employees through same-sex cohabitation 
This method consists of identifying the same-sex couples in available public surveys (national 
censuses, population surveys, data from the Centers for Disease Control, etc.). All members of 
same-sex female pairs are considered as a population sample of lesbians and all members of same-
sex male pairs are considered as a population sample of gay men. Of course, the identification of the 
homosexual populations through same-sex cohabitation, is characterized by certain limits inherent in 
the method: (i) it leads to measurement error, by identifying wrongly as homosexuals some 
individuals who are in fact heterosexuals
16
, (ii) it does not allow identify homosexuals who do not 
live with partners i.e. a significant proportion of the populations concerned, and (iii) it does not 
indicate whether the individuals identified as homosexuals are identified as such by their employers. 
(ii) Direct identification of homosexual employees 
Direct identification of homosexual populations is possible only if specific surveys asking 
respondents about their sexual behavior or their sexual orientation, are available : US General Social 
Survey or US National Health and Social Life Survey  (BADGETT [1995], [2001], BERG & LIEN [2002], 
BLACK & al. [2003], BLANDFORD [2003]), National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys 
(CARPENTER [2007a]), International Social Survey Programme (HEINECK [2009]), Survey on recent 
graduates in Netherlands (PLUG & BERKHOUT [2004], [2008]), California Health Interview Survey 
(CARPENTER [2005a]), Canadian Community Health Surveys (CARPENTER [2008b]). 
Direct identification of homosexual populations has a double interest. First, compared to the indirect 
identification method, this approach allows a more precise measure of homosexual populations, by 
integrating homosexual people not living with partners and avoiding measurement errors attributable 
                                                 
14 This point is also emphasized by CARPENTER [2004] 
15 In a discrimination and signaling framework, it can be profitable for heterosexual workers, in order to obtain 
higher wages, to use marriage as a signal of heterosexuality (CARPENTER [2005b], [2007b], FRANK [2006]). 
16 This measurement error can however be reduced by filtering populations of cohabitants on the basis of 
various criteria: age (to eliminate juvenile cohabitation), family links, income (economic cohabitation), 
nationality (to exclude migrant workers), etc. Several articles show, that identifying homosexual populations 
via a cohabitation criterion is precise and efficient (see BLACK & al. [2000], CARPENTER [2004]) and that the 
bias associated with this method is less than 0.4%. 
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to the presence of heterosexual individuals among same-sex cohabitants. Furthermore, most of the 
surveys used collect information on specific variables relevant for the discrimination analysis:  type 
of sexual behaviors, knowledge or not of the sexual orientation of respondents by their employers, 
etc. 
This method is, however, characterized by specific problems that contribute to weakening the results 
obtained. For example, the identification of homosexual populations on the basis of their self-
reported sexual orientation (or sexual behavior) must face (i) the imperfect nature of the link 
between "homosexuality" and "sexual behavior" and (ii) the well known and inherent limits of self-
identification. Several studies point out that the estimate of wage discrimination varies greatly, 
depending on the chosen definition of homosexuality: from 13% to 18% for men according to 
BLACK & al. [2003], and from 20% to 30% according to CARPENTER [2007a]. 
Whatever the method used, the main characteristics of the homosexual populations that are 
identified are relatively similar. Gays and lesbians are much more highly educated than their 
heterosexual counterparts
17
; they are significantly younger and more urban
18
 and they are fewer to 
have children
19
. In the same studies, the proportion of women working part time is two to four times 
higher among heterosexual women (between 40% and 50% depending on the studies) than among 
lesbians (10% to 25%). In contrast one generally observes the opposite, although with a much 
smaller difference, when comparing gays and heterosexual men. Finally, compared to their 
heterosexual counterparts, gays have lower wages (about -5%), while lesbians have a wage premium 
(+5%). 
The different results obtained concerning the nature of wage discrimination are homogeneous. 
Among the twenty empirical studies surveyed by AHMED & HAMMARSTEDT [2009], only two conclude 
to an absence of negative discrimination against gays. Symmetrically, almost all available studies 
point to the absence of negative discrimination against lesbians (two-thirds of these studies even 
concluding that there is a positive wage premium). 
Despite this “agreement” on the nature of wage discrimination, quantitative results on the extent of 
the discrimination are quite heterogeneous. For gays, observed wage discrimination varies from a 
limited level of about 5% (ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2002], PLUG & BERKHOUT [2004], [2008]), to higher 
levels of 10% (ELMSLIE & TEBALDI [2007], AHMED & HAMMARSTEDT [2009], ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2007], 
CARPENTER [2008], HEINECK [2009]), 20% and more (BERG & LIEN [2002], BLACK & al. [2003], CARPENTER 
[2007a]) and even 30% (BADGETT [1995], BLANDFORD [2003]); for lesbians, the discrimination varies 
from +4% (PLUG & BERKHOUT [2004]),  to +10% (ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2004], [2007]), about +15% 
(BLANDFORD [2003], CARPENTER [2008]) and +20% (ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2002], BLACK & al. [2003]). 
These large differences are mainly due to differences in (i) the method adopted for the identification 
of homosexual populations, (ii) the definition used for homosexuality (in the case of direct 
identification), (iii) the filters used to identify homosexuals couples among same-sex cohabitants (in 
the case of indirect identification), (iv) the control variables used in the wage equation (and 
especially the use or not of marital status) and finally (v) the econometric method used to estimate 
the wage equation
20
. If a careful analysis of the different results does not allow detecting a 
systematic bias associated with one of the two available methods for identifying homosexual 
populations, it is clear that the estimated extent of wage discrimination decreases when one 
increases the number of, wisely chosen, control variables. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 see ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2004], [2005], [2007], BLACK & al. [2003], ELMSLIE & TEBALDI [2007], AHMED & 
HAMMARSTEDT [2008], CARPENTER [2004], [2007a], [2008b] and, for France, DIGOIX & al. [2004], TOULEMON 
& al. [2005]. On average, in these various studies, about 27% of heterosexual men and women have college 
education, as compared with 43% of gays and over 48% of lesbians 
18 Same references as the previous footnote 
19 On average, in the various studies, about 40% of heterosexual men and women have children as compared 
with 4.5% of gays and 18% of lesbians (same references that supra; see also FRANK [2006]) 
20 Especially the correction, or not, of the selection bias by estimating first a probit model of participation 
(Heckman two-step estimation). 
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2. – Data  
2.1. – Database 
Measuring wage discrimination based on sexual orientation from French data is a difficult exercise, 
since there are no surveys identifying the sexual orientation of employees and providing sufficient 
economic and individual information on the employees. In particular, sexual orientation is not an 
observable variable in the Employment Survey conducted by the French National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies  (INSEE) or the Annual Declaration of Social Data (DADS) 
completed by the employers. As we saw in the preceding section, an indirect identification of sexual 
orientation may, however, be achieved by considering same-sex couples (see, for example 
TOULEMON & al. [2005]). This is the method used in this paper: we define as homosexual couples all 
households of two same-sex adults reporting a friend relationship. Among these same-sex 
households only 3% of men and 10% of women have children. This finding is consistent with the 
available French statistics on homosexual parenting. 
The identification of homosexuals based on same-sex cohabitation may of course lead to wrongly 
considering some individuals sharing the same dwelling as gays or lesbians when in fact they are 
not. The most frequent case is that of cohabitation for economic reasons or linked to some 
characteristics of their occupations: students, migrant workers, seniors, farmers, etc. To minimize 
the probability of wrongly classifying some heterosexual employees as gays or lesbians, we first 
identified all households constituted only of two adults of the same gender (with or without 
children) who report sharing a friendship, and we then imposed the following filters: 
– Exclude couples where one member is a student, apprentice, farmer or retired person; 
– Require that the younger member of the couple be over 27 years of age and that the older 
be over 30 years of age; 
– Require that neither member of the couple be over sixty years of age; 
– Require that both members of the couple be French; and 
– Select only households with an income higher than 1000 € /month21 
Even if these filters eliminate the greater part of heterosexual same-sex cohabitation, the resulting 
database can, however, still contain outliers in wages due to completion mistakes of the interviewer 
or a misunderstanding of some questions in the survey (for example confusion between euros and 
French francs); we therefore excluded all individuals whose monthly wage, in real terms, is below 
50€ or above 20 000 €. 
After applying these filters, and given the restrictive measure of the number of homosexual couples 
we adopted, the resulting database contains only a small number of gay and lesbian couples for each 
year. We then built an aggregated database covering the period 1996-2007 by stacking the data. The 
final database that we used in our econometric analysis includes 904 individuals belonging to same-
sex couples, whom 788 are salaried employees. 
2.2. – Descriptive statistics 
The sample of heterosexual was subjected to exactly the same selection constraints as those 
described above for same-sex couples. The main characteristics of the four populations (“men” vs. 
“women”  “heterosexuals” vs. “homosexuals”) constituting our samples are presented in table 1. 
These statistics are expressed as a % of the total of all employees (i.e. private sector employees + 
civil servants) except for (i) characteristics denoted by * which are expressed as values and (ii) 
characteristics indicated by # which are expressed as a % of all individuals constituting the relevant 
population. The standard deviations appear in parentheses in each table cell. For example, 28.5% of 
heterosexual male employees did complete high school, while this is true for only 22.2% of the 
lesbians
22
; 11.6% of all gays are unemployed or inactive, etc. 
  
                                                 
21 The threshold value of 1000€ has been indexed in accordance with the evolution of the average wage. A 
lump-sum income of 300 €/month, corresponding to a reservation income, has been attributed to inactive 
members of the couples. Similarly, a lump-sum income of 1000€/month has been attributed to independent 
workers. 
22 Throughout this article, we use the terms "male homosexuals" or gays – and "female homosexuals" or 
lesbians – to denote the members of our samples of same-sex couples. 
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Table 1. – Descriptive statistics 
 
MALE FEMALE 
Heterosexual Homosexual Heterosexal Homosexual 
 Sample Population size / Ratio (%) 119 645   99.62% 461      0.38% 115 875   99.72%   327      0.28% 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Age 
 35 18.37      (0.11) 41.20      (2.30) 25.90      (0.13) 34.12      (2.63) 
35 - 45 36.93      (0.14) 38.38      (2.27) 37.34      (0.14) 37.87      (2.69) 
 45 44.89      (0.14) 20.42      (1.88) 36.76      (0.14) 28.02      (2.49) 
Average age* (years) 43.42      (0.02) 38.04      (0.37) 41.39      (0.02) 39.87      (0.44) 
Degrees 
No degree 28.54      (0.13) 18.14      (1.80) 32.55      (0.14) 22.23      (2.30) 
High School 47.67      (0.14) 42.71      (2.31) 42.03      (0.15) 35.54      (2.65) 
College 10.28      (0.09) 16.12      (1.72) 14.53      (0.10) 21.31      (2.27) 
Master’s, PhD 13.51      (0.10) 23.03      (1.97) 10.88      (0.09) 20.88      (2.25) 
Family 
situation 
One child or more  (vs. No child) 76.21      (0.12) 2.86      (0.78) 76.29      (0.13) 10.31      (1.68) 
Average number of children * 1.46    (0.003)   0.06     (0.015) 1.46     (0.003) 0.180      (0.03) 
Married  (vs. Unmarried) 80.84      (0.11) 1.59      (0.58) 80.68      (0.12) 1.80      (0.74) 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. 63.02      (0.14) 31.60      (2.17) 62.94      (0.14) 43.97      (2.75) 
Town  ≥ 200 000 pop. 20.86      (0.12) 24.18      (2.00) 20.91      (0.12) 20.00      (2.21) 
Paris metropolitan area 16.12      (0.11) 44.22      (2.32) 16.15      (0.11) 36.07      (2.66) 
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sector of 
activity 
Industry (vs. Services) 41.81      (0.15) 15.74      (1.92) 17.49      (0.14) 13.08      (2.06) 
Employees private sector # 61.74      (0.14) 56.53      (2.31) 41.43      (0.14) 47.68      (2.77) 
Employees public sector #  21.74      (0.12) 23.61      (1.98) 29.02      (0.13) 37.47      (2.68) 
Non employees private sector #  12.23      (0.10) 8.28      (1.29) 5.32      (0.07) 6.59      (1.37) 
Inactive, unemployed # 4.30      (0.06) 11.58      (1.49) 24.23      (0.13) 8.27      (1.53) 
Firm size 
 50 employees 40.29      (0.14) 39.12      (2.28) 33.29      (0.14) 37.34      (2.68) 
50 - 500 20.45      (0.12) 14.49      (1.64) 15.53      (0.11) 14.26      (1.94) 
 500 22.05      (0.12) 17.57      (1.78) 16.26      (0.11) 18.72      (2.16) 
na 17.21      (0.11) 28.82      (2.11) 34.92      (0.14) 26.68      (2.53) 
Working hours 
Full time,  30 h /week  96.44      (0.11) 92,86      (2.12) 76.47      (0.15) 85.33      (2.47) 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week 3.32      (0.04) 7.13      (1.06) 20.04      (0.10) 13.23      (1.75) 
Part-time, 15 h /week 0.24      (0.01) 0.00      (0.00) 3.50      (0.04) 1.430      (0.60) 
Special work schedule (vs. Normal) 15.00      (0.10) 19.49      (1.85) 9.68      (0.09) 12.93      (1.86) 
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 41.45      (0.14) 45.42      (2.32) 27.02      (0.13) 48.15      (2.77) 
Skilled 36.41      (0.14) 34.43      (2.22) 30.45      (0.14) 35.60      (2.65) 
Unskilled 7.98      (0.08) 6.63      (1.16) 19.19      (0.12) 4.76      (1.18) 
Other 14.17      (0.10) 13.53      (1.60) 23.33      (0.12) 11.50      (1.77) 
Type of job 
Blue collar   (vs. White collar) 38.82      (0.14) 21.94      (1.93) 13.55      (0.10) 11.25      (1.75) 
Short term labor contract       
(vs. Fixed-term, Long term)  
1.24      (0.03) 1.82      (0.62) 0.71      (0.02) 0.190      (0.24) 
Time with 
the firm 
 1year 12.18      (0.09) 27.47      (2.08) 31.81      (0.14) 21.08      (2.26) 
1 to 5 years 18.80      (0.11) 31.42      (2.17) 16.95      (0.11) 22.66      (2.32) 
 5 years 69.02      (0.13) 41.12      (2.30) 51.25      (0.15) 56.25      (2.75) 
Average time* (months) 159      (0.36) 82.51      (4.36) 139      (0.39) 121      (6.65) 
Wage (€2008) 
 1250 30.71      (0.13) 40.00      (2.29) 62.04      (0.14) 35.54      (2.65) 
1250 - 2500 51.35      (0.14) 43.59      (2.31) 33.09      (0.13) 55.06      (2.76) 
 2500 17.93      (0.11) 16.41      (1.73) 4.87      (0.06) 9.40      (1.62) 
Average wage* (€) 2029       (3.66) 1874     (71.09) 1405      (2.84) 1708    (66.81) 
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Same-sex couples represent 0.33% of all the couples of our sample, i.e., more or less the middle of 
the range corresponding to the studies of DIGOIX & al. [2004] –  who estimate at 0.56% the ratio of 
same-sex couples in France  –  and TOULEMON & al. [2005] who evaluates this ratio at about 0.08%. 
Among all identified same-sex couples, one finds that 58.5% are male couples and 41.5% are female 
couples, which corresponds to the distribution found in the two studies cited above. Given the 
weights applied, we finally obtained an estimate of about 45 000 gay couples in France (including 
26 000 gay couples and 19 000 lesbian couples) – to be compared to 10 500  in TOULEMON & al. [2005] 
and 76 000 in DIGOIX & al. [2004]; our estimate is very similar to what we find in the ACSF
23
 survey, 
where 0.3% of men surveyed reported they "live in a couple with a same-sex partner", leading to an 
estimate of about 30 000 gay couples in France. 
With an average age of 38.8 years, the members of homosexual couples are younger than those of 
heterosexual couples, whose average age is 42.4 years. They are also better educated (40% have 
college degrees, against only 25% of heterosexuals) and more urban (40% live in the Paris 
metropolitan area, compared with 16% for straight men and women). One recognizes here the main 
"features" of homosexual populations, observed not only in most foreign studies (see above) but also 
in France (see DIGOIX & al. [2004] and TOULEMON & al. [2005]). 
Although only few homosexuals have children, the percentages are not negligible: 3% of gays and 
over 10% of lesbians are parents, which shows the importance of same-sex parenting. We find here, 
again, a typical characteristic of homosexual populations: parenthood is more prevalent among 
women than men: 18% vs. 4% (ELMSLIE & TEBALDI [2007]), 23% vs. 0.5% (AHMED & HAMMARSTEDT 
[2009]), 28% vs. 8% (CARPENTER [2004]) ; measured by "presence of children in the household", 
TOULEMON & al. [2005] also note that this fact characterizes about 6% of lesbians but nearly 0% of 
gays. 
If we focus on job characteristics rather than individual characteristics, 84% of gays have a job in 
the service sector, while only 58% of male heterosexual workers have jobs of this type. Gays are 
also more likely to work part time or to be "inactive or unemployed”, but less likely to be blue collar 
workers or to work in the private sector. Concerning the earnings, the average wage of gay 
employees is 8% lower than that of male heterosexuals. It is interesting to note that we find here, 
although attenuated, some features commonly attributed to females in the labor market, and often 
explained by the role played by women in the domestic sphere (see the so-called specialization 
theory : BECKER [1965], [1981]). Finally, the average job stability within the firm is twice as low 
among gay employees as among heterosexuals: only 41% of the former have had the same employer 
for more than five years, against nearly 70% of the latter
24
.  
Lesbians are more qualified than other women: nearly 84% of them are "highly skilled" or "skilled", 
against less than 58% of heterosexual women. Of course different levels of investment in human 
capital and/or in the workplace may explain this significant difference. Unlike what has been found 
for gays, lesbians are less likely than other women to be "inactive or unemployed" (about 8% against 
more than 24%), to work part time (14.7% against 23.5%) and the average wage of lesbians is +20% 
higher than that of heterosexual females. Such differences can be explained by a less pronounced 
specialization in domestic tasks for lesbians than for heterosexual women
25
. As we found for gays, 
female homosexual employees are more likely to work in the public sector than heterosexual women 
(44% against 41%) and have, on average, lower job stability. 
Table 2 below summarizes the main differences between gays and lesbians, on one hand, and their 
heterosexual counterparts, on the other. 
  
                                                 
23 Survey on Sexual Behavior in France (ACSF), conducted in 1992 (cf. Les comportements sexuels en France, 
SPIRA A., BAJOS N. and the ACSF team, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1993). 
24 In an imperfect information framework such a difference could be explained by a strategic behavior of gay 
employees, to prevent their employers from accumulating over time a sufficient amount of information, leading 
to the revelation of their sexual orientation. 
25
 See for example ANTECOL & STEINBERGER [2009], for an econometric study of the central role played by 
sexual orientation on labor supply in the US. 
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Table 2. – Main characteristics of gays and lesbians employees 
                (Compared to their heterosexual counterparts) 
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Gays −     (+) −   − − 
Lesbians −      − − −   
Some differences (white cells) are common to gays and lesbians − they are younger, have higher 
levels of education, are more urban, tend to work in the service sector and the public sector, and 
have lower job stability − while other differences (grey cells) display opposite signs. These 
oppositions are associated with differences generally observed between men and women in the labor 
market. According to the specialization theory, gays work in more part time jobs than their 
heterosexual counterparts and are more often inactive or unemployed, while the reverse is true for 
lesbians. 
3. – Results  
3.1. – Econometric method 
To assess the impact of sexual orientation on the wages of individuals living in couples, we estimate 
earnings equations where the logarithm of the monthly wage
26
, ln(wi), is explained both by job 
characteristics Zi (qualifications, years with the firm, type of job, working hours, firm size, sector of 
activity, etc.), employee personal characteristics Xi (age, degrees, family situation, location), and a 
specific sexual orientation variable, gayi (which takes the value 1 for same-sex couples and 0 for 
other couples): 
 ln i i i i iw Z X gay u          [1] 
Of course, estimates of equation [1] suffer from sample selection bias because wages of unemployed 
or inactive individuals are not observed. We thus introduce a selection equation, where the 
difference Ui between the wage and the reservation wage of individual i, is explained by his or her 
personal characteristics, 
i i iU X v      [2] 
The disturbance terms ui and vi follow a bivariate normal distribution. It must be noted here that Ui is 
an unobservable variable. What one observes is a dummy variable Empi taking the value 1 if 
individual i is employed (Ui  0) and 0 in the other cases. The selection bias arises because some 
unobservable characteristics (or characteristics omitted in the selection equation) can play a role in 
access to employment and determination of wage levels. Therefore, the sample of employed 
individuals may include people with personal characteristics Xi rather unfavorable for access to 
employment and wage level, but whose unobservable (or omitted) characteristics are favorable to 
employability and wage level. Such individuals are characterized by a significant disturbance term 
vi, incorporating these omitted or unobservable variables. The direct consequence of such a situation 
is similar to the problem caused by the existence of omitted variables in the wage equation: the 
impact of (observed) personal characteristics Xi is underestimated
27
; HECKMAN [1979] shows that, 
given the selection, the expected value of the error term in the wage equation is no longer zero: 
 
 
ln( ) 0, , , ln( ) , , ,i i i i i i i i i i i
i
i i i
i
E w U X Z gay E w v X X Z gay
X
Z X gay
X

 
   

         
   

 
                                                 
26 The wage wi is a net monthly salary including all monetary compensation. 
27 Note that the cause of the selection bias is not the consequence of having a non-random sample, but arises 
merely because individuals whose observable characteristics are unfavorable have a large error term in the 
selection equation 
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where (Xi)/(Xi) is the so-called Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). This term, corresponding to the 
selection, can be interpreted as a missing explanatory variable in the wage equation [1]. The two-
step Heckman procedure (Heckit) makes it possible to deal with this problem
28
. In the first step, the 
probability of being employed is estimated, using a Probit model taking into account the personal 
characteristics Xi, which allows us to generate the inverse Mills ratio. In the second step, the wage 
equation, including the inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory variable, is then estimated. 
This procedure for estimating selection and wage equations calls for several comments. Insofar as 
the error terms of the selection equation and the wage equation are correlated, the introduction of the 
Mills ratio generates an heteroskedasticity of the disturbance term of the wage equation
29
. To correct 
for heteroskedasticity – during the second step – one either corrects the variance-covariance matrix, 
or one estimates the wage equation using the generalized least squares procedure. 
The identification of the effect of individual characteristics in the wage equation is based on the 
nonlinearity of the Mills ratio. If the magnitude of fluctuations in individual characteristics is low, 
the Mills ratio can be approximated properly by a linear relationship in Xi. In such a case, the wage 
equation is characterized by a strong collinearity, resulting in imprecise estimates. To circumvent 
these two problems, the selection equation must include one or several additional explanatory 
variables, which do not appear in the wage equation
30
. In our model, three new variables are thus 
introduced in the selection equation: 
– The situation one year ago in the labor market, which captures the degradation of human 
capital after a long period of unemployment; 
– The occupation/qualifications of the partner, a proxy variable for partner income, which has 
a negative effect on the labor supply of the individual; 
– The home-ownership situation of the individual. Ownership in contrast to rental can reduce 
the mobility of job seekers and thus affect the probability of finding a job in the labor 
market. 
The wage gap observed between homosexual and heterosexual employees, which is −7.06% for 
males and +21.56% for women, can originate from three components: 
– The gap induced by the difference in observable characteristics between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals:     ˆˆHomo Hetero Homo HeteroZ Z X X     ; 
– The gap resulting from a difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals in the 
probability of being employed; 
– The gap resulting only from sexual orientation ˆ . 
It is this last component that will allow us to measure the extent of wage discrimination against 
homosexual employees. Table 12 (see annex) summarizes all the variables used in the selection and 
wage equations
31
  and presents the characteristics of the base case. 
3.2. – Private sector 
We first estimate, for the private sector, the magnitude of wage discrimination against gay and 
lesbian employees living in couples
32
. As shown by previous empirical works, evaluations of wage 
discrimination are significantly different for gays and lesbians. Thus we estimate the model 
separately for men and women. 
The results obtained with (i) the direct estimation of a single wage equation, and (ii) the estimation 
of a selection equation and a wage equation following the two-step Heckman procedure (Heckit), are 
presented in Table 3. Most estimated coefficients have the expected signs. One finding is a 
                                                 
28 HECKMAN [1976], [1979]. 
29 The residual variance of the earning equation also depends on the Mills ratio and, therefore, on individual 
characteristics. 
30 The addition of these new variables can be viewed as the introduction of specific constraints necessary for 
identification. 
31 Sexual orientation is not introduced in the selection equation. Nevertheless, to be cautious, we decided to re-
estimate the model with a selection equation including sexual orientation as an explanatory variable. All the 
estimated parameters of the wage equation and, in particular, the estimates of the wage discrimination remained 
the same. The results are available upon request. 
32 The definition of the private sector used here includes the large national public companies. 
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significant wage discrimination against gay employees. Gay men suffer on average a wage penalty 
equal
33
 to 6.3%, whereas lesbians benefit from a wage premium of +2.1%. This difference between 
male and female homosexuals is similar to that obtained by ARABSHEIBANI & al. [2007] on US and UK 
data (14% for gays and +6,5% for lesbians in the US; no significant penalty for gays and +6% for 
lesbians in the UK), CLAIN & LEPPEL [2001] on US data (from 16% to 22% for gays and 2.2% for 
lesbians) and KLAWITTER & FLATT [1998] on US data (30% for gays and +16% for lesbians). 
Table 3. – Private sector: Selection and wage equations for males and females 
PRIVATE SECTOR ESTIMATES 
MALES FEMALES 
One step 
estimate of 
the wage 
equation 
Heckit One step 
estimate of 
the wage 
equation 
Heckit 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sexual orientation Gay -0.065  -0.065 ns  0.021 
Age 
Age  0.008 -0.024 *0.008 0.005 -0.009 ns 
Age squared -0.002 -0.002 ns -0.003 -0.014 ns 
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD  0.410 -0.518 0.417 0.316 -0.110 0.306 
College  0.136 -0.360 0.140 0.099 -0.263 0.088 
No degree -0.057 -0.003 -0.057 -0.081 -0.089 -0.085 
Family situation 
Number of children  0.006 ns -0.005 -0.019 -0.166 -0.026 
Married    0.039 0.109 0.038 -0.018 ns -0.017 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop.   -0.009  -0.009 -0.027  -0.026 
Paris metropolitan area 0.143  0.144 0.178  0.176 
Real estate capital Home owner  0.134   0.204  
Partner income 
Occupation / 
qualifications of the 
partner 
Craftsman, merchant, 
entrepreneur, independent 
 *-0.082   -0.521  
Middle or top managers  -0.257   -0.363  
Employee or worker, 
unskilled, inactive, 
unemployed 
 0.340   0.621  
One year ago on the 
labor market 
Unemployed  -2.449   -2.481  
Inactive  -0.510   -1.541  
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sector of activity Industry 0.034  0.034 0.064  0.064 
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.048  -0.048 0.071  0.072 
 500 employees 0.045  0.045 0.136  0.136 
Working hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.487  -0.486 -0.483  -0.483 
Part-time,  15 h /week -1.270  -1.270 -1.365  -1.366 
Flextime 0.091  0.091 -0.246  -0.248 
Special work schedule 0.049  0.049 0.057  0.057 
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 0.295  0.295 0.257  0.254 
Unskilled -0.120  -0.120 -0.231  -0.213 
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.096  -0.096 -0.075  -0.074 
Short term labor contract        ns  ns 0.074  0.076 
Time with the firm 
 1year -0.038  -0.037 -0.038  -0.044 
 5 years 0.072  0.072 0.131  0.130 
 
           Inverse of Mill’s ratio  -0.030  0.074 
          Intercept 7,301 0.960 7.309 7.096 0.582 7.066 
           Size of the sample 72 322 88 204 72 322 45 816 91 054 45 816 
No star=coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% level of 
confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence 
Note: To avoid rounding problems, especially for the quadratic terms, the age variable was centered and divided by 10; this is also 
the case in all following tables. 
 
The unconditional wage gap, of almost +20%, observed between lesbians and heterosexual women, 
is thus mainly due to specific characteristics of lesbians, who are on average better educated, hold 
                                                 
33 With the semi-logarithmic specification we used, the net impact on wage of the sexual orientation is given by 
ei1 where i is the estimated coefficient associated with the explanatory variable Gay or Lesbian. 
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jobs requiring higher levels of skills, are less often part-time workers, live in urban areas and are less 
likely to raise children. The positive wage discrimination is very weak and contributes little to 
explain the unconditional initial wage gap
34
. 
In contrast, the wage gap between gay and heterosexual employees, originates partly from 
differences in observable characteristics – which affect the salaries both positively and negatively 
and have thus a global limited impact – but mainly from wage discrimination. Gays, on average, are 
better educated, have jobs requiring higher levels of skills and live in urban areas, which contributes 
to a higher wage than for heterosexual men; but they are also younger, are employed by smaller 
firms and have a lower job stability, which tends to reduce their average wage. It is thus wage 
discrimination, measured by the estimation of our model, which mainly explains the initial wage 
gap. 
Recalling that the individuals in our samples live in couples and keeping in mind that the so-called 
marriage premium (i) is not available to homosexual employees because same-sex marriage is 
forbidden in France, (ii) can be a premium to a “signaled heterosexuality” in an homophobic 
environment (see section 1.3 above), it becomes clear that another (upper bound) estimation of wage 
discrimination against gay and lesbian employees can be obtained, by simply adding the marriage 
premium to the amount of discrimination calculated above. 
The marriage premium, calculated from the estimated coefficient associated to the variable Married 
in the wage equation, is equal to +3.9% for men and is negative (1.7%) for women. By integrating 
this premium, as compared with their heterosexual married counterparts, gay employees suffer a 
wage penalty of 10.2%, while lesbians now have a premium of +3.8%. 
The selection equation requires some comments. As we consider a wage equation for the private 
sector alone, and a selection equation on the set of individuals that can potentially get a job in the 
private sector, the selection equation measures the probability of having a job in the private sector. It 
can thus be analyzed as a reduced form, summarizing the probability of being employed and the 
conditional probability, for an employed individual, of belonging to the private sector. Therefore, 
the negative coefficient associated  for example  with the variable Master’s/ PhD, in the selection 
equation, means that an individual with a Master’s/PhD has a lower probability of getting a job in 
the private sector (and of course not "a lower probability of getting a job") than people with less 
education. 
The magnitude of the wage gap between men and women resulting from the selection equation is 
low, which is not surprising since the rates of participation in the labor market are similar between 
men and women (this finding is consistent with MEURS & PONTHIEUX [2006], where the wage gap 
between men and women resulting from discrimination is very low and rather in favor of women). 
We have therefore re-estimated the earnings equations without taking into account the selection (one 
step estimate of the wage equation). The results reported in table 3 are close to those obtained with 
the Heckit even if the difference, as regards the amount of discrimination, between gays and lesbians 
is slightly attenuated: 6.3% against gays and no wage discrimination against lesbians. 
3.3. – The public sector: a shelter against wage discrimination ? 
To examine, whether the public sector constitutes a shelter against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, we estimated the model for the public sector only. Results are clear and given in table 4 
below. Unlike the results obtained for the private sector, lesbian employees do not receive a 
premium, which is consistent with what was expected. However, wage discrimination strongly 
affects gay employees in the public sector, although with a magnitude slightly smaller than in the 
private sector, but far from negligible: 5.6% in the public sector against 6.3% in the private 
sector
35
. Since wages in the French public sector are based on a common and publicly known salary 
scale, the presence of such discrimination may at first be viewed as a surprise. However, this result 
is not surprising: 
                                                 
34 As in the US, the higher level of wages earned by lesbians, compared to heterosexual females, is mainly due to a 
higher level of investment in human capital, particularly in education (see for example ANTECOL & al. [2007]). 
35 A lower, but not negligible, wage discrimination in the public sector compared to the private sector, is a 
result that has already been obtained in several articles: ZWEIMULLER & WINTER-EBMER [1993], HOFFNAR & 
GREENE [1996], BERSON [2009]. 
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– First, even though hiring is, for the most part but not always, anonymous for national civil 
servants, this is not always the case for promotions which are generally based on the 
candidate's file and one or more interviews. Therefore the estimated discrimination can be 
explained by the presence of a glass ceiling which results in slower promotions for gays. 
– Second, compensation policies and governance rules are not uniform throughout the public 
sector and some public administrations, such as local administrations for example, have 
degrees of freedom in wage setting that are similar to what exists in the private sector. 
– Finally, employers in the public sector are less subject to pressures from competition than 
those in the private sector. The so-called taste for discrimination can thus play out more 
freely in the public sector, because this sector is less "punished" by the market in case of 
deviation from an efficient wage policy. 
 
Table 4. – Public sector: Selection and wage equations for males and females 
PUBLIC SECTOR ESTIMATES 
MALES FEMALES 
One step 
estimate of 
the wage 
equation 
Heckit One step 
estimate of 
the wage 
equation 
Heckit 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sexual orientation Gay *-0.058  -0.058 ns  ns 
Age 
Age 0.012 0.022 ns ns 0.019 ns 
Age squared ns -0.004 ns ns -0.004 ns 
Degrees 
Master, PhD 0.325 0.624 0.326 0.294 0.406 0.276 
College 0.115 0.438 0.115 0.107 0.474 0.089 
No diploma -0.079 -0.066 *-0.079 -0.085 -0.104 **-0.080 
Family situation 
Number of children 0.024 *0.012 0.024 -0.006 0.038 -0.007 
Married   0.024 *-0.032 0.024 ns ns -0.005 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. -0.025  -0.025 ns  ns 
Paris metropolitan area 0.058  0.058 0.073  0.073 
Real estate capital Home owner  -0.057   ns  
Partner income 
Occupation / 
qualification of the 
partner 
Craftsman, merchant, 
entrepreneur, independent 
 -0. 544   -0.695  
Middle or top managers  0.260   0.128  
Unskilled employee or worker, 
inactive, unemployed 
 -0.281   -0.803  
One year ago on the 
labor market 
Unemployed  -1.553   -2.002  
Inactive  -0.094   -0.932  
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sector of activity Industry 0.109  0.109 ns  ns 
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.034  -0.034 -0.037  -0.036 
 500 employees 0.061  0.061 0.032  0.033 
Working hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.145  -0.145 -0.314  -0.314 
Part-time,  15 h /week -0.705  -0.705 -1.031  -1.033 
Flextime 0.102  0.102 -0.105  -0.104 
Special work schedule *0.014  *0.014 0.067  0.067 
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 0.261  0.261 0.272  0.270 
Unskilled -0.097  -0.097 -0.273  -0.246 
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.072  -0.073 -0.134  -0.133 
Short term labor contract        ns  ns ns  ns 
Time with the firm 
 1year ns  ns -0.041  -0.039 
 5 years 0.143  0.143 0.187  0.187 
 
           Inverse of Mill’s ratio  ns  -0.052 
          Intercept 7,171 -1.235 7.169 7.063 -0.759 7.131 
           Size of the sample 10 980 88 204 10 980 18 762 91 054 18 762 
No star = coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% level of 
confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence, ns= not statistically significant 
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3.4. –Summary of the main results 
Table 5 summarizes the evaluations of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation, obtained by 
estimating the model following the two-step Heckman procedure. Because the marriage premium 
may be the consequence of discriminatory practices, two measures of discrimination are useful: a 
lower bound, corresponding to the coefficient of sexual orientation in the wage equation and an 
upper bound, corresponding to the lower bound increased by the marriage premium. The first 
evaluation compares – all things being equal – the incomes of gays and lesbians to those of their 
unmarried heterosexual counterparts, while the second one compares their incomes with those of 
their married heterosexual counterparts. 
The results of the various estimates are consistent. Even if we consider the lower bounds of wage 
discrimination, gays suffer a high wage penalty in both sectors: about 6.3% in the private sector 
and 5.6% in the public sector. The magnitude of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
thus greater than the gender wage gap estimated at 5.4% in the French labor market (MEURS & 
PONTHIEUX [2000]). This result highlights the extent of discrimination against gay employees. As 
compared with their heterosexual counterparts, French lesbians enjoy a limited wage premium of 
about +1.9% in the private sector vs. less than +1.5% in the public sector. 
Table 5. – Wage discrimination based on sexual orientation 
TWO-STEP HECKMAN PROCEDURE 
(HECKIT) 
Lower bound of 
discrimination 
Marriage 
premium 
Upper bound of 
discrimination 
Private sector 
Males 6.3% +3.9% 10.2%  
Females +2.1% 1.7% +3.8% 
Public sector 
Males 5.6% +2.4% 8.1% 
Females 0.0% 0.5% +0.5% 
4. – Developments 
In the French labor market, wage discrimination based on sexual orientation seems primarily to 
affect gay men. This result is consistent with the theoretical insights, the nature of homophobia (see 
1.1 and 1.2) and the empirical results obtained for other countries (see 1.4). This section deals with 
the impact of individual variables (skills, age, etc.) on the extent of the discrimination faced by gay 
employees. 
4.1. – Do skills protect gays against discrimination ? 
We study in this section whether jobs requiring higher levels of skills, which are therefore better 
paid, are characterized by a lower level of wage discrimination against gay employees. To address 
this question, we present in table 6, the men’s earnings equations for two polar qualification levels: 
the high-skill jobs on the one hand, corresponding to Executives and Intellectual occupations, and 
the low-skill jobs on the other hand, consisting of Employees and Workers. 
To simplify the analysis we estimated the model directly for the overall economy by aggregating the 
public and private sectors. The column “Overall economy” displays the coefficient associated with 
each particular characteristic Z, while the column “X Public sector” displays the estimated coefficient 
associated with the explanatory crossed variable “Z X Public sector”; therefore, when the return 
associated with a particular characteristic is different between the public sector and the private 
sector, the coefficient in the “Overall economy” column corresponds de facto to the private sector, 
while the one appearing in the "Public sector” column describes the spread between the public and 
the private sectors
36
. 
The results are quite clear. For low-skill jobs, wage discrimination is not significant in either the 
private sector or the public sector. In contrast, for high-skill jobs the magnitude of this 
                                                 
36
 For example, for high-skill jobs, the explanatory variable “Number of children” is statistically significant and 
plays negatively, while the variable “Number of children X Public sector” is statistically significant and plays 
positively. This means that the return associated to the number of children in the private sector is equal to        
e
-0.0041= 0.4% while it is equal to  e
-0.004+0.0151= +1.11% in the public sector. 
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discrimination is very high (9.4%), with no obvious distinction between the two sectors. Whatever 
the sector, gay employees with high-skill occupations are the most affected by discriminatory 
practices. This result, after all, makes perfect sense. First, employers do not care about the sexual 
orientation of low-skill workers who have a very limited internal and external visibility; second, 
opportunities for wage discrimination against unskilled workers are few(career progressions are 
weak or even nonexistent, wages are set around the minimum wage, mandatory wage scales exist, 
etc).  
Conversely, the glass ceiling effect comes into full play for highly skilled jobs, particularly jobs of 
senior managers, which are the most "visible" and often include a representation component. The 
gay employees can see their careers hampered compared to their heterosexual counterparts, through 
less frequent promotions. Such situations can be the consequence of heterosexism in the workplace 
and/or linked to the endogenization, by the employer, of a homophobia attributed to the clients of 
the firm or to other employees within the firm. Thus, contrary to what one might think at first, high-
skill occupations do not protect gay employees, but instead expose them more frequently to 
discriminatory practices. 
Table 6.  Wage equations for men by qualification levels 
EARNINGS EQUATIONS  FOR THE OVERALL 
ECONOMY 
HIGH-SKILL JOBS LOW-SKILL JOBS 
Overall 
economy 
X 
  Public sector 
Overall 
economy 
X 
Public sector 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 
C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sexual orientation Gay ns ns -0,099 ns 
Age 
Age 0.002 -0.002 0.014 0.004 
Age squared -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD 0.074 ns 0.263 ns 
College 0.091 ns 0.096 ns 
No degree -0.063 ns -0.033 ns 
Family situation 
Number of children -0.004 0.015 0.014 0.024 
Married   0.031 ns 0.065 **-0.035 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. -0.013 ns ns ns 
Paris metropolitan area 0.093 -0.066 0.145 -0.077 
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
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S
 
Sector of activity 
Industry 0.028  0.033  
Public 0.117  -0.192  
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.042  -0.067  
 500 employees 0.070  0.034  
Working hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.485 ns -0.537 0.361 
Part-time,  15 h /week -1.362 0.357 -1.450 0.787 
Flextime 0.047  0.038  
Special work schedule 0.055 ns 0.062 -0.080 
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.049  -0.055  
Short term labor contract        -0.023  ns  
Time with the firm 
 1year -0.035  -0.042  
 5 years 0.089 0.076 0.025 0.051 
 
          Intercept 7,265 7.819 
          Size of the sample 42 755 17 699 
No star = coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% 
level of confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence, ns= not statistically significant 
4.2. – Age and seniority: discrimination and the information disclosure 
Unlike other forms of wage discrimination (gender, ethnicity, age), discrimination based on sexual 
orientation does not rely on a directly observable individual characteristic. Valuable information 
about sexual orientation may, however, be acquired indirectly by the employer, through careful 
observation and a suitable analysis of some individual characteristics of the employee. These 
characteristics include marital status, number of children, neighborhood of residence, presence or 
absence of the partner at public events organized by the company, etc.  
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Although the observation of these characteristics does not allow an employer to make a perfect 
assessment of the sexual orientation of a worker, it allows him – at least – to revise, upward or 
downward, the likelihood that the employee is gay. In this context, the acquisition of new 
information and the belief revision process will allow the employer to evaluate the sexual orientation 
of an employee with an increasing degree of accuracy over time. The observed wage discrimination 
should then increase with age (since being unmarried and childless for a junior does not convey the 
same information than for a senior) and the employee's time of service with the company (since the 
accumulation of information takes time). 
In this subsection we study whether the mechanism described above – continued acquisition of new 
information and the belief revision process – is at work. To do this we estimate wage equations for 
two age groups: less than 35 years of age and more than 45. Because only gays seem to suffer from 
wage discrimination, we limit our investigations to the male population. The results in Table 7 
below show unambiguously that the magnitude of wage discrimination increases with age. For gay 
employees under 35, the wage penalty is estimated to be 5.8% both in the private and the public 
sectors; beyond 45 years, it shifts to 12.1% in the private sector and is not significantly different 
from this value in the public sector. 
This difference between the two age groups, as regards the extent of wage discrimination, has been 
statistically tested and is significantly different from zero: all other things being equal, the older the 
gay employees, the higher the wage penalty. As previously stated, at least two effects combine to 
achieve this result. First, as the age of an employee increases, more information on his sexual 
orientation can be extrapolated from specific variables such as marital status and the number of 
children; second, older workers are those for whom wage discrimination had time to appear, through 
the slowdown of the career implied by the existence of a glass ceiling. 
Table 7.  Wage equations for men by age 
EARNINGS EQUATIONS  FOR THE OVERALL 
ECONOMY 
 35 YEARS ≥45 YEARS 
Overall 
economy 
X 
  Public sector 
Overall 
economy 
X 
Public sector 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 
C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
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S
 
Sexual orientation Gay -0.060 ns -0.130 ns 
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD 0.361 -0.111 0.463 -0.080 
College 0.110 ns 0.180 -0.042 
No degree -0.036 ns -0.050 ns 
Family situation 
Number of children 0.012 0.024 -0.010 ns 
Married   0.05 ns 0.037 ns 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. ns ns -0.019 ns 
Paris metropolitan area 0.161 -0.123 0.138 -0.063 
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
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T
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Sector of activity 
Industry 0.031  0.035  
Public -0.073  -0.089  
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.041  -0.057  
 500 employees 0.034  0.057  
Working hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.436 0.391 -0.509 0.365 
Part-time,  15 h /week -1.001 ns -1.300 0.761 
Flextime 0.077  0.080  
Special work schedule 0.048 **-0.032 0.039 -0.032 
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 0.212 -0.079 0.344 -0.033 
Unskilled -0.105  -0.135  
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.115  -0.111  
Short term labor contract        ns  *0.036  
Time with the firm 
 1year -0.022  -0.061  
 5 years 0.060 0.040 0.098 0.066 
 
          Intercept 7.188 7.327 
          Size of the sample 16 031 35 501 
No star = coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% 
level of confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence, ns= not statistically significant 
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The results of wage equations by time of service (Table 8) make it possible to make the diagnosis 
presented above more precise and complete. For time of service of less than one year, no significant 
wage discrimination can be detected. Significant wage discrimination (6.6%) seems to prevail only 
for time of service spanning between one and five years. Beyond five years of service in the firm, 
one obtains no significant wage discrimination, either in the public sector or in the private sector. 
These results suggest a fast learning process about sexual orientation: beyond five years of seniority 
some gay employees, conscious of the progressively increasing awareness of their sexual orientation 
and the associated discriminatory practices, are encouraged to leave the company
37
; those who 
decide to stay are those who suffer the least from such practices, which explains the nullity of the 
wage penalty estimated on the subset of gay employees with high seniority (5 years). 
These results shed light on how wage discrimination is exercised against gay men. In both the public 
and private sector, it is not the salary at the time of hiring which is responsible for the wage 
discrimination, but rather the existence of a glass ceiling which slows the careers of gay employees. 
Table 8.   Wage equations for men by seniority 
EARNINGS EQUATIONS  FOR THE 
OVERALL ECONOMY 
LESS THAN 1 YEAR  1 TO 5 YEARS MORE THAN 5 YEARS  
Overall 
economy 
X  Public  
sector 
Overall 
economy 
X  Public 
sector 
Overall 
economy 
X  Public 
sector 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 Sexual 
orientation 
Gay ns ns -0.068 ns ns ns 
Age 
Age 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.005 
Age squared -0.006 0.007 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.002 
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD 0.409 ns 0.369 ns 0.431 -0.120 
College 0.130 ns 0.119 ns 0.143 -0.044 
No degree **-0.023 ns -0.050 **-0.051 -0.063 ns 
Family 
situation 
Number of children  0.036  0.041  0.021 
Married   0.043 ns 0.050 ns 0.036 ns 
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. ns ns ns ns -0.015 -0.017 
Paris metropolitan area 0.157 ns 0.162 -0.094 0.135 -0.081 
J
O
B
 C
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A
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A
C
T
E
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T
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Sector of 
activity 
Industry 0.079  0.056  0.022  
Public ns  -0.113  -0.054  
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.043  -0.046  -0.046  
 500 employees 0.032  0.031  0.050  
Working 
hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.636 0.382 -0.658 0.463 -0.387 0.256 
Part-time,  15 h /week -1.360 ns -1.369 ns -1.010 0.518 
Flextime -0.035  0.089  0.115  
Special work schedule ns ns 0.040 -0.056 0.058 -0.040 
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 0.314 ns 0.312 -0.065 0.289 -0.032 
Unskilled -0.142  -0.113  -0.115  
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.048  -0.090  -0.095  
Short term labor contract        ns  ns  0.149  
 
          Intercept 7.25 7.29 7.39 
          Size of the sample 6 166 18 667 60 809 
No star = coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% level 
of confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence, ns= not statistically significant 
4.3. – Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
Wage discrimination has so far been estimated using a dummy variable for sexual orientation. In 
doing so we adopt the implicit assumption that discrimination affects all homosexual employees in 
the same way, regardless of their individual characteristics. Such an assumption is obviously 
excessive, since wage discrimination – see above – varies depending on the characteristics of the 
employee (sex, age, seniority, etc.) and the job held (qualifications). However this choice was 
constrained, because of the limited number of same-sex couples available in the French Employment 
Surveys. Even though the problem of limited sample size is probably inherent in this kind of study, 
                                                 
37 This explains the lower job stability of gay employees as compared to their heterosexual counterparts (see Table 1). 
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we try to estimate in this subsection a “simple” model that makes it possible to account for 
differences in the returns to observable characteristics, between heterosexual and homosexual 
employees. The process used is similar to what one uses when applying the Oaxaca-Blinder 
method
38
. By using an analysis in terms of contribution to discrimination we are better able to 
identify the characteristics for which wage discrimination based on sexual orientation is the most 
pronounced. 
The estimation results for men are presented in Table 9 below, while the decomposition of 
discrimination according to the differences in returns to observable characteristics is provided in 
Table 10. The model presented in Table 9 was obtained starting from a general specification 
integrating as explanatory variables all the products of the two variables “gay” and “sector” with all 
the other variables. This, in practice, is equivalent to considering, as in Oaxaca-Blinder, at least two 
different models: one for heterosexual employees and another for gays. In our case, we tested and 
then imposed, if necessary, all the restrictions corresponding to equal returns between gay and 
heterosexual employees. 
Eventually, one gets the specification presented in the table, where only the significant differences in 
returns appear: the level of education, the location (Paris metropolitan area), the characteristic of 
having a part-time job (15-30 h /week) and the characteristic of having a “special work schedule”.  
Table 9.  Wage equations for men with returns differences (Oaxaca-Blinder) 
EARNINGS EQUATIONS  FOR THE OVERALL 
ECONOMY 
(with returns differences) 
MALES MALES  GAY 
Overall 
economy 
X  Public  
sector 
Overall 
economy 
X  Public  
sector 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 
C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
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T
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Age 
Age 0.007 0.006   
Age squared -0.002 0.003   
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD 0.412 -0.086 -0.340 0,288 
College 0.137 *-0.022 -0.167 **0.183 
No degree -0.057 -0.022   
Family situation 
Number of children 0.006 0.019   
Married   0.039 **-0.015   
Location 
Town  200 000 pop. -0.009 -0.016   
Paris metropolitan area 0.142 -0.083 0.134 **-0.131 
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
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E
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T
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S
 
Sector of activity 
Industry 0.034 0.075   
Public -0.142    
Firm size 
 50 employees -0.048 **0.013   
 500 employees 0.045 **0.016   
Working hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week -0.486 0.340 *-0.124  
Part-time,  15 h /week -1.271 0.564   
Flextime 0.092    
Special work schedule 0.050 -0.034 -0.124  
Qualifications 
Highly skilled 0.295 -0.033   
Unskilled -0.120 ns   
Type of job 
Blue collar    -0.095 0.022   
Short term labor contract        ns    
Time with the 
firm 
 1year -0.038 Ns   
 5 years 0.072 0.070   
 
          Intercept 7.303 
          Size of the sample 83 302 
No star = coefficients statistically significant at 99% level of confidence, * coefficients statistically significant at 95%-99% 
level of confidence, ** coefficients statistically significant at 90%-95% level of confidence, ns= not statistically significant 
It is then straightforward to calculate the magnitude of wage discrimination by summing all the 
differences in returns, with identical characteristics, between gays and heterosexuals. The resulting 
evaluation is similar to what has been presented in the previous sections. This confirms the existence 
                                                 
38 Cf. OAXACA [1973], BLINDER [1973], OAXACA & RANSOM [1994]. 
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of a wage discrimination that is slightly higher in the private sector (6.3%) than in the public sector 
(5.0%). 
Inspection of Table 10 clearly shows the main mechanisms responsible for this discrimination. It is 
mainly through the highest educational degree obtained that discrimination occurs: the educational 
level of a gay is less valued than that of his heterosexual counterpart. This fact is especially true if it 
is a high degree, confirming the greater exposure to discrimination of highly graduated gays. 
Table 10.  Breakdown of the wage discrimination 
BREAK DOWN OF THE WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION 
DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 
THE SAMPLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION 
PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC 
Degrees 
Master’s, PhD 12.5% 28.0% 
− 4.26 % 
(0.007) 
−1.44 % 
(0.027) 
College 11.6% 18.2% 
− 1.93 % 
(0.006) 
   +0.29 % 
(0.009) 
Location  Paris metropolitan area 16.0% 14.5% 
 2.16 % 
(0.006) 
 0.04 % 
(0.013) 
Working 
hours 
Part-time, 15-30 h /week 3.2% 13.0% 
− 0.39 % 
(0.002) 
− 1.61 % 
(0.010) 
Special work schedule 15.1% 18.3% 
− 1.86 % 
(0.007) 
 -2.26 % 
(0.008) 
WAGE DISCRIMINATION   
− 6.28 % 
(0.008) 
− 4.98 % 
(0.017) 
         Between brackets the standard deviations calculated by a bootstrap performed with 1000 replications 
5. – Conclusion 
This first attempt to assess the extent, in the French labor market, of wage discrimination based on 
sexual orientation provides some useful results. First of all, a significant wage discrimination against 
gay employees does exist in France, in both the private and the public sector. Despite controlling for 
many variables, and especially for the marriage premium, the estimated wage discrimination lies 
between 6% to 7% in the private sector and 5% to 6% in the public sector, a magnitude similar 
to that of gender wage discrimination. Keeping in mind that all gay employees of our sample are not 
identified as such by their employers, it is certain that those identified as homosexuals suffer a 
higher wage penalty than the average level we have estimated. This highlights the importance of 
discriminatory practices against gays within the French labor market. 
In contrast, we were not able to identify a significant wage discrimination against lesbians. Such an 
asymmetry between gays and lesbians, as regards the magnitude of wage discrimination in France, is 
consistent with the “theoretical intuition” and with most of the results from other countries. The 
asymmetry observed in our results reflects a diversity of discriminatory practices, explained by the 
specificity of homophobia and the different nature of stereotypes associated with male and female 
homosexuality. 
A higher degree does not protect gays from discrimination. On the contrary the higher the degree, 
the higher the magnitude of wage discrimination against gay employees. The pink glass ceiling 
effect is most noticeable for highly skilled jobs, which are the most "visible" and include a 
representation component. As the learning process of employers about the sexual orientation of their 
employees takes time, the extent of wage discrimination increases with the age of employees and 
their seniority within the firm. 
The results presented in this paper on the extent of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation 
in France, are in the low range of comparable estimates about other countries, especially Anglo-
Saxon countries. Even if homophobia/heterocentrism may be more pronounced in the US, which 
could help to explain such a difference in results, our feeling is rather that several studies suffer from 
neglecting some essential control variables (marriage premium, hours of work per week, sector of 
activity), thus overestimating the magnitude of the wage penalty in the countries involved.. 
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6. – Annex: variables used in the selection and wage equations 
 
Table 11.  List of variables used 
The underlined characteristics correspond to the base case 
VARIABLES 
SELECTION 
EQUATION 
WAGE 
EQUATION 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sexual orientation Gay  vs.  Heterosexual   
Age Age, Age squared   
Degrees 
No degree  vs.  A-Level or Professional 
degree  vs.  College  vs. Master’s, PhD 
  
Family situation 
Number of children    
Married  vs. Unmarried   
Location 
Town  200 000  vs.  200 000  vs. Paris 
metropolitan area 
  
Real estate capital Home owner  vs. Leaseholder   
Partner income 
Occupation / 
qualifications of the 
partner 
Craftsman, merchant, entrepreneur, 
independent  vs. Middle or top managers 
vs. Technicians, associate professionals 
vs. Unskilled employee or worker, 
inactive, unemployed 
  
One year ago on the 
labor market 
Employed  vs. Unemployed  vs. Inactive   
J
O
B
 C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
 
Sector of activity Industry  vs. Services   
Firm size  50 employees  vs. 50-500  vs. 500    
Working hours 
 15h/week vs.15-30h vs. 30h vs.Others   
Normal work schedule  vs.Special work 
schedule 
  
Qualifications Unskilled  vs. Skilled  vs. High-skilled   
Type of job 
Blue collar  vs. White collar   
Short term labor contract  vs. fixed-term 
or long term labor contract 
  
Time with the firm  1 year vs.1-5 years vs.5 years   
     Note: Our main sample being constituted of twelve stacked Employment Surveys (1996-2007), time dummy variables – 
one for each year – have also been systematically introduced into the equations, to remove a possible effect of the 
business cycle 
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